Financial openness and financial development in the South Mediterranean Sea countries : institutional approach and calculation of development thresholds by Beji, Samouel
European Research Studies,  
Volume XI, Special Issue (3-4) 2007 
 
Financial Openness and Financial Development in the South 
Mediterranean Sea Countries: Institutional Approach and Calculation of 
Development Thresholds 
 
By 
Samouel BEJI
1
 
Abstract: 
 
The central theme of the paper is the financial development issue in a context 
of financial globalization for the south Mediterranean sea (SMS) countries. The 
choice of this theme is motivated by the importance of the economic development and 
the growth in these countries, who are usually the subject of political instabilities, and 
are distinguished by weak political institutions. Our aim in this paper is to point out 
that the financial openness in the conditions of the SMS countries would be 
prejudicial for its financial development. In contrast, the financial openness would be 
beneficial for the financial development in the presence of the adequate legal and 
institutional development. This is our main hypothesis.  
To do so, we used an econometric panel error-correction model with non-
overlapping data for the period 1980-2005. The model links financial development 
indicators to institutional and legal indicators, in order to calculate institutional 
thresholds. The actual state of the institutional and legal environment in the region 
would not allow them to ameliorate the efficiency of their financial systems. Then, it's 
not recommended, if we trust on the results founded, to operate a financial openness. 
Instead of opening the "financial frontiers", it's better to prepare this transition by an 
improvement of the institutional and the legal environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of the paths to follow in order to realize the financial development 
for the developing economies and even for the developed ones has not finished 
provoking reactions, suggestions and polemics. So what makes this debate 
interesting? If we trust on the works of McKinnon (1973); Shaw (1973) and for the 
recent studies of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990); Bencivenga and Smith (1991); 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992); King and Levine (1993); Levine (2004) we 
conclude that the financial development is prominent for the growth and the economic 
development.  Although the fact that this question has not yet been distinct concerning 
the effectiveness and especially for the sense of the causality between the two 
concepts. 
After the beginning of the vast wave of the financial globalization which 
accompanied a larger movement of globalization, we attend, since the end of the 
eighties, to many attempts of the developing countries to insert the globalized 
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financial sphere. This trend is explained by the thought on the benefits of the openness 
and the exchange on a large scale. Following the example of the commercial 
liberalization, the policymakers in that period thought that the financial integration 
would be advantageous for the economic development. Nonetheless, the financial 
crises episode for many developing countries, threw doubts about the advantages of 
the financial liberalism and the trust on the financial integration, yet defended strongly 
by the "Washington Consensus" ideas. Since these countries already engaged on 
reforms plans in order to abolish the restrictions on capital movements and to 
liberalize their financial systems.  
In the same way for the decision makers of economic policies in these 
emergent countries, this understood that the financial opening is not like the 
commercial liberalization. They also understood that the financial liberalization 
requested a number of economic, financial and almost institutional and political 
prerequisites, to do so. The question was then, how to liberalize instead of to liberalize 
or not, in order to realize the financial development and so the economic 
development. 
These crises attracted the attention on the necessity to be doted by an adequate 
frame for the financial openness. Furthermore, it's necessary to proceed by steps and 
by following progressive plan to avoid the risks of speedy openness. The examples of 
South Korea, China, Malaysia in Asia and the Chili for Latin America defend the idea 
of the sequencing and the importance of the gradualism in the process of the financial 
openness. Indeed, these countries opted for an exclusive and alternative way of 
financial openness, different from the globalized version recommended by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFI). This "protected" financial openness avoided 
them to live the mishaps of the other experiences of financial globalization. 
This analysis lead us to express the same interrogations for the case of the 
South Mediterranean Sea countries (SMS), given the need to the economic 
development for these countries on one hand, and their specificities in the other. The 
aim of this paper is to try to define an alternative path for the SMS countries, given 
their features, to realize the economic upswing via the financial development, while 
avoiding the drawbacks experienced by the other developing countries in the nineties. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow; the second section is dedicated to 
a highlight of the general situation of the financial systems for the countries of the 
region. The third section present the theoretical framework of the new concept of 
financial development based on the quality of the institutional, legal and political 
environment. The forth section is an econometric analysis utilizing a panel 
encompassing 10 south Mediterranean countries over the period 1980 to 2005 in order 
to study the long term effect of capital account openness on financial development, 
after controlling of the level of institutional and legal development.  
The econometric study encompasses also a study of the sense of causality 
between the financial openness and the financial development, as well as a test 
whether we have to operate a commercial liberalization before the financial openness. 
The final section represent concludes remarks. 
 
2. Analysis of the Financial Development Situation in the South Mediterranean          
 
The governments of the SMS countries started since the last two decades, 
reforms of their financial systems under the influence of the Structural Adjustment 
Plan (SAP). The aim of these reforms is to create the ideal conditions for the 
development of banks and financial markets, for more active participation and more 
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important role in the economic growth process. Concerning this, there exists 
significant differences for the financial development levels among the countries of the 
region. Even if we consider that the development level evoked remains under who 
observed in the other developing countries, especially in Asia. 
Following the study made by Hoskins (2003) on the state of financial 
development in the region, we can set a classification of SMS countries through their 
degree of financial development. The indicators selected are : Ratio of money plus 
quasi money to GDP, ratio of M1 to M2, domestic credit to GDP, deposit/lending 
spreads, deposit and lending rates, deposit money bank assets to GDP, deposit money 
bank assets by asset in % of total assets, ownership of commercial banks by number 
of banks, ownership of commercial banks by equity, stock market capitalization and 
number of shares listed. 
 
High level Middle level Low level 
Israel Algeria Libya
Jordan Egypt Syria
Lebanon Morocco
Tunisia
Turkey
      Source : IMF 
 
There exist several reasons explaining the specific nature of the financial 
systems in the region. The political and economic instability caused partially by the 
difficult situation of security, may be one of the plausible reasons. This uncertainty 
damage the level of trust, shrink consequently the lending activity and then all the 
activity of investment. These risks are reflected in the low level of sovereign credit 
ratings for countries in the region. 
The late development of the financial and banking sectors are partially 
explained by the existence of other sources to finance the economy. For example, the 
high yields of the energy sector in some countries (especially Algeria and Libya) 
shrank the development of the banking sector. Because they represent a main source 
of financing for the economy. It substitutes then the banking finance and reduces its 
development. 
Furthermore, according to the classic view of the financial repression authors 
like McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Roubini et Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Levine 
(1997) the net involvement of the State in the financial sectors (especially in Algeria, 
Syria and Egypt) bothers the emergence of competitive and efficient systems. The 
governments, according to this view, set the lending and deposit rates arbitrary, 
without consideration to the scarcity of resources on the financial markets, deal out 
the credits to the public companies, or use them to finance its deficit, as it involves the 
extraction of implicit tax calling "the inflation tax". This situation cause, according to 
these authors, the rise of non performing credits and prevents financing the private 
sector, who would offer better investment opportunities. Competition in the banking 
systems is also bothered by the settlement of barriers on entry by local and foreign 
banks in many countries. The limited competition leads to limited innovation on the 
banking sector and then restricts the transformation of short term deposits to long term 
loans. 
The quality of banking governance and corporate governance, represent also 
an important factor explaining the current level of financial development in the 
region. For the banking sector, the experts of the IMF consider the government 
involvement and the restrictions on competition as the cause of the lack of innovations 
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in the lending activity. So it hinders the skills formation in credits attribution and 
forecasting risks. On another hand, and according to an institutional view, the 
weakness of the judicial system makes difficult the enforcement of the lenders rights. 
So it hinders the banking financing as the bankers couldn't turn to law to recover the 
collateral in case of bankruptcy or insolvency.  
Furthermore, banking regulation and supervision doesn't reach the level of 
international standards, involving a rise in savers risks concerning banks quality and 
performance
2
. Even if these remarks on the judicial and legal system are relevant to 
relate the current situation of financial development in these countries, it would be 
better to be more moderated concerning the government involvement in the banks 
management. Since, resorting only to the market doesn't inevitably allow the best 
resources allocation.  
The banking and financial markets in these countries are naturally imperfect, 
as well as all the financial and banking markets in general. For the case of these 
countries, the weakness of the institutional and legal system is due to a lack of 
transparency needed to a good markets functioning. The government involvement in 
this case is justified. Further, in the beginning of any development process, the State 
intervention is often requested to guide and lead the functioning of banks and 
financial markets. We can refer, to illustrate our point of view, to the case of some 
European countries, such as France or Italy who had pursued a government 
intervention policy in the financial system, since the end of the World War II until the 
end of the seventies. These countries collected the benefits of this strategy by 
realizing the most important growth rates in that period, thanks to the protection of 
their financial systems. 
We notice at this level of analysis, that financial reforms initiated in the SMS 
countries are the outcome of the Structural Adjustment Plans which are the direct 
consequence of the desire to spread the liberal convictions of the "Washington 
Consensus". These ideas are related by the International Financial Institutions, 
themselves controlled by the USA and the EU (by habit, the IMF is always directed 
by an European and the World Bank by an American). We can have a doubt then on 
the real possibility of these institutions to well manage countries that they don't 
necessarily know enough about them, given the fact that the features and specificities 
of the emerging and developing countries are different from the industrialized ones. 
Moreover, it's interested to the developed countries to help emergent economies to 
realize the financial integration, in order to well profit from the investment 
opportunities existing in these countries.  
The globalization would be "forced" then to them. The imposition of the 
globalization movement can be clearly illustrated in its financial wing called, financial 
globalization. Since it targets one of the economy's pillars, which represent the 
national sovereignty. This is a real danger for the developing economies. It represents 
n economic threat, like demonstrated by the phase of the financial crises in Latin 
America and East-South of Asia. But also an institutional threat, since the financial 
globalization is recommended by the international financial institutions that apply it 
through a standard way and measures that are not necessarily adapted to the social and 
economic reality of these countries. Then, it's obvious that this movement gives rise to 
distrust and creates autonomy reactions against it. 
The importance to be doted by a favorable legal and institutional environment 
seems then to be essential to reach a high level of financial development and so to 
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realize the hoped economic development and growth. Hoskins (2003) notice the "bad" 
quality of the legal and institutional environment as the main reason that prevents the 
SMS countries to reach that aim. Indeed, the majority of experts and analysts 
interested by the financial development issue in the region notice the importance of a 
good governance, and institutions high quality to enhance the effectiveness of the 
financial systems.  
Furthermore, in a context of globalization featured by markets integration and 
general adoption of privatization companies' policy, it's necessary to reinforce 
regulation and supervision frameworks. In general, the institutional environment and 
the banking systems have to be more friendly and more favorable to do business as 
noted by Hoskins (2003) : " Weak judicial and legal systems make it difficult for 
financial institutions to enforce contracts. This includes weak bankruptcy laws and 
procedures, unclear land and collateral ownership rights, as well as difficulties in 
recovering collateral when necessary.  
Improvements in these areas will also facilitate the development of deeper 
capital markets which at present remain undeveloped”
3
 and then make them capable 
to resist to the violent waves of the financial globalization. It is within this same 
framework that belong this work, since the aim is to demonstrate that the financial 
globalization applied to the SMS countries does not automatically generate progress, 
growth and wealth. In the next section, we will try to study the real link between the 
legal, institutional environment quality and the financial development, by studying the 
economic literature on this point, and the theories concerning that link. 
 
3. The Link between the Financial Development and the Institutional       
Development 
 
The link between the financial openness and the financial development is not 
free of ambiguity. Indeed, in order to profit from the capital account liberalization, the 
financial systems have to be strengthened by a developed legal and institutional 
framework. Specifically, the economies where the legal and judicial system don't 
guarantee the property rights, or don't look after efficiently the enforcement of 
financial contracts, suffer in general from a lack of incentives to lending activities and 
the settlement of financial transactions. Lenders and borrowers legal rights, the 
credibility and transparency level of laws organizing the financial sector are the main 
factors that govern the financial sector in an economy, and give or not incentives to 
turn to the financial system.  
According to this, Claessens and al (2002)
4
 and Caprio and al (2004)
5
 founded 
that more lenders are protected by an efficient judicial system, deeper is the financial 
system. By considering the effective level of legal and institutional development, we 
can then surround the ambiguity between the financial openness and financial 
development. Indeed, we can adopt the hypothesis that the financial development can 
be the outcome of the financial openness, only if the whole economy reaches a 
reasonable level of institutional and legal development. 
In addition to the legal environment quality which is important to realize the 
financial development, we notice in the recent economic literature the emergence of 
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another important factor, considered as the natural complement of a good institutional 
structure. It's the concept of social capital approximated by the level of trust and 
cooperation among individuals. 
 
a. The Importance of Social Capital 
 
Fukuyama (1997) considers that: « Social capital can be defined simply as the 
existence of a certain set of informal rules or norms shared among members of a 
group that permits cooperation among them. The sharing of values and norms does 
not in itself produce social capital, because the values may be the wrong ones... The 
norms that produce social capital...must substantively include virtues like truth-telling, 
the meeting of obligations, and reciprocity »
6
. For Bowles. S and Gintis. H (2002): « 
Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one's associates, a willingness to 
live by the norms of one's community and to punish those who do not »
7
. 
The social capital is a concept borrowed from sociology, related to the benefits 
taken by individuals via their adhesion to communities and associations (Bourdieu, 
1985) or the extend and quality of human relationships in a society and its potential to 
be enhanced (Coleman, 1990). In this context, a high level of social capital leads to 
the exclusion and the punishment of all who deviate from a set of social conventional 
standards. 
The relationship between social capital and financial development attracted the 
attention of few economists. Comparing to the studies on the link between social 
capital and economic development. Only the studies of Guiso . L, Sapienza. P and 
Zingales. L (2000) ; Hong. H, Kubik. J. D and Stein. J. C (2001) ; Calderon. C, 
Chong. A and Galindo. A (2001) had clearly analyze the link between the two 
concepts, via empirical studies connecting indicators of social capital and financial 
development indicators. 
The existence's intuition of a link between social capital and financial 
development is the result of the fact that a financial contract between a lender and a 
borrower needs a giver level of trust to be accomplished and to its clauses to be 
respected. Since in a financial contract, the lender transfer an amount of money at the 
date t to the borrower, in the hope to recover it at t+1 in the future. In order to avoid 
an opportunist behavior, another clauses comes complete the contract, like collateral 
requirement.  
However, in several cases and given many factors, the collateral system looses 
its effectiveness because of the lack of the system of regulation adopted (like the 
difficulty to the lender to access to collateral in case of the borrower's insolvency) or a 
lack in the system of contracts enforcement. Even, in the case of a strict application of 
laws, the financial contracts are intrinsically incomplete. It involves that no contract 
can guarantee completely the refund of a loan. It involves too, that even if the law is 
strictly respected, the trust will have an important role to play in defining the financial 
market deepness, given the fact that a financial contract is basically incomplete. 
Furthermore, trust is more important in the economies where legal rights of 
lenders are less protected and judicial system is weak. Hence, a high level of trust 
would favor the settlement of financial contracts between individuals and then 
contribute to the development of financial markets. Moreover, the respect of financial 
                                                    
6 Fukuyama, F. (1997), "Social Capital," Tanner Lecture on Human Values, P : 378-379 cited in 
Durlauf, N. S et Fafchamps, M. (2004) : « Social Capital », NBER Working Paper Series 10485. P : 4 
7 Bowles S et Gintis. H (2002) : « Social Capital and Community Governance », Economic Journal 
112, P : 422, cited in Durlauf, N. S et Fafchamps, M. (2004) : art, op. cite. P : 5. 
Financial Openness and Financial Development in the South Mediterranean Sea Countries:        113 
Institutional Approach and Calculation of Development Thresholds 
contracts is not necessarily due to the threat of legal punishment, but it's an issue of 
mutual trust among different market participants. Indeed, if the debtor don't respect 
his commitment and don't repay his debt in the future, the use of financial contracts 
will be shrank and even involves, in case of generalization of the phenomena, to a 
high insolvency and risk to weaken the whole banking sector
8
. Hence, the trust level 
can be considered as a significant factor of development or banking distress et could 
even explain the differences between financial systems and economic development 
between countries. 
However, like noticed by Baudassé, T. and Montalieu, T. (2004), the 
importance of social capital in the financial transactions and relationships can take 
more specific aspects
9
. Since the lender in case of contracting a credit is in a situation 
of information asymmetry compared to the borrower, as the later is more informed 
about the eventual earnings and the feasibility of the project. In the aim of avoiding 
this asymmetry information, M. Ferrary (2003) suggests two methods.  
The first has a Cartesian nature. It's the "instrumental risks appraisal". It 
consists to evaluate the solvency of a debtor relating to objective data and 
information. For an individual credit, it consists to check and study some borrower's 
features, like the age, the job, the income, the banking history... For the firms, it 
consists to check the accounting records and the evaluation of some financial 
management elements. The second method is more subjective. It's the "social 
appraisal of the financial risks". It consists to create with the borrower informal 
relationships thanks to it, the lender would be able to know more personal and 
subjective information about the borrower.  
This personal information is about the borrowers’ honesty and also about the 
feasibility and the soundness of the projects. So, these information would never been 
known by the lenders otherwise. In these approach, the banker will have a : 
"...strategy of social infiltration depends on which social network underlies the 
business that he wants to evaluate.  
When a social network is geographically-based (for example, the area around 
the branch), the successful financial counsellor should frequent places where his 
potential clients socialize in order to find individuals who have information and to 
learn the local actors' reputation"3
10
. To illustrate his idea, Ferrary (2003) refers to the 
example of the French restaurants in Paris, managed in majority by businessmen 
originating from a region in southern France. This situation incited a Parisian bank to 
enrol a financial counsellor from this community, because he knows more than 
another about them. 
In theory, the social capital approximated by the trust level is positively linked 
to measures of breadth and size of the financial sector, and negatively linked to 
measures of its efficiency. To understand this conjecture, we have to come back to the 
initial of the financial intermediary operation. This operation links a deposer who is 
the lender to a debtor who is the borrower, via a financial intermediary. In this 
process, the deposers and the lenders are both exposed to a problem of optimisation 
that appears some risks. 
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The risk of the deposers is that the financial intermediary adopts an 
opportunistic behaviour, given the high and sometimes prohibitive monitoring costs. 
The lenders confront the risk that borrowers won't repay the credit. In these two cases 
(opportunistic behaviour of the financial intermediary and the insolvency of the 
borrower) the initial owner (the deposer) couldn't recover his funds. The importance 
of these risks and their impacts on the deposers decisions depend of a several factors, 
especially in an institutional dimension. Inside this institutional dimension, trust (or 
social capital) is very important. A low level of trust could exacerbate these risks. 
Since in this case, the borrower is more risky to get insolvent than in case of a high 
level of trust. That's why we notice that in countries where trust is not a shared feeling 
between individuals, the financial market is nor large, neither deep. 
The deposers and lenders are influenced by the trust in their partners when 
they establish the finance agreement. The deposers loose the control of their funds 
when they leave them to the financial intermediary, and lenders loose a partial control 
of their funds when transferring them to borrowers. If the trust level is low in an 
economy, the deposers would doubt that bankers (financial intermediary) will 
properly treat their funds. Similarly, lenders would have doubts about the solvency of 
the borrowers. This situation would restrict the extension of credit activity, and 
discourage the use of banks by savers. So it slows automatically financial market's 
activity, even for the whole economic activity.  
Concerning the financial markets efficiency in case of low trust level, the 
theoretical conclusions stay the same. Indeed, financial intermediaries are facing high 
marginal costs in countries where risks are high. These costs are partially transferred 
to borrowers and lenders via high interest rate margins, like noticed by Angbazo 
(1997) and Pong Wong (1997). Then, if financial risks are exacerbated by low trust 
level, the efficiency proxies like interest rate margins are expected to be negatively 
correlated with trust level. 
 
b.  Law and Finance Theory 
 
A prolific economic literature noticed the incidence of financial development 
on growth. Levine, R. and Zervos, S. (1998) showed that the development of banking 
sector and financial markets is a good proxy of economic development in general
11
. 
For a microeconomic point of view Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), and also 
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1998)
12
 showed in their studies that financial institutions 
are crucial for firms and industry's expansion.  
Although the existence of discords among theorists about this question, it 
seems to be clear the reliance of a positive relationship between financial 
development and growth. This link fixes more than issue about the financial 
development state in many countries. Indeed, what makes some countries reach 
growth and economic development by financial development and other no? The law 
and finance theory gives more than an explanation about this question and fix the 
issue of the legal and institutional environment to explain the differences between 
financial developments
13
. 
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The first part of this theory argues that where the legal and judicial system is 
strong, respect rigorously the property rights, investor rights and protect contracts 
between individuals, savers are more encouraged to turn to banks and then finance the 
need of firms to invest, contributing by the way to the expansion of capital markets. 
The absence of that legal framework wouldn't allow investor to access to private 
financing and so hinders financial development. 
The second part of the law and finance theory argue that the different legal 
traditions born in Europe during the last centuries, expanded after to all over the world 
by conquests, the different colonization waves and herding phenomena explain the 
differences seen today concerning investor protection laws, the application of 
financial contracts and then the differences between financial development levels, if 
we trust the first part of that theory.  
La Porta and al (1998)
14
 were interested by laws governing the investor 
protection, the quality of enforcement of these laws and the property concentration in 
49 countries. Their analyses lead to three main results. First, laws are different 
although they give a set of adequate rights to investors. In particular, the common law 
legal tradition countries would protect more effectively investors than French civil 
legal tradition. German civil law and Scandinavian one take a middle rank between 
them. In addition, there isn't evidence confirming the existence of privileged category 
of investors. Evidence show, rather, that common law legal tradition protects all kinds 
of investors.  
This result corroborates the hypotheses of La Porta and al (1998) about the 
investors range's multiplicity of rights in the presence of multiple legal traditions. 
These rights are induced by laws and not inherent to the equities themselves. Second, 
the enforcement of laws is different according to the countries. Indeed, the laws 
enforcement is more rigorous in German civil law and Scandinavian countries. The 
laws enforcement is also accurate in common law countries, but less rigorous in 
French civil ones. The quality of laws enforcement, on the contrary to laws 
themselves is improved with the income level.  
Third, evidence supports the hypothesis that countries develop substitutes to 
bad investor protection systems. La Porta and al (1998) argue that : " Some of these 
mechanisms are statutory, as in the case of remedial rules such as mandatory 
dividends or legal reserve requirements. We document the higher incidence of such 
adaptive legal mechanisms in civil law countries.  
Another adaptive response to poor investor protection is ownership 
concentration. We find that ownership concentration is extremely high around the 
world, consistent with our evidence that laws, on average, are only weakly protective 
of shareholders. In an average country, close to half the equity in a publicly traded 
company is owned by the three largest shareholders.  
Furthermore, good accounting standards and shareholder protection measures 
are associated with lower concentration of ownership, indicating that concentration is 
indeed a response to poor investor protection"
15
. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis of conditions to the financial development in a 
financial globalization context 
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The model studied in this paper is largely inspired by the model of Ito (2005) 
which is practiced for a panel of emerging countries, with a special attention to the 
region of South-Eastern Asia
16
. 
In what coming, we will study the long term effect of capital openness on the 
financial development in a model controlled by the level of institutional and legal 
development. The model is specified in the equation (1) : 
 
fdi t fd-i5-t =  0+ !fdi5-t +  1 "#$!%&;_5 +  2Li +  3 (Li kaopeni5-t) + x;_5 '+Ui 
 
FD is a measure of financial development; KAOPEN is a measure of financial 
openness; X is a vector of economic control variables; Li is a measure of legal, 
institutional development. 
 
a. The presentation of the model variables 
 
In this model, the vector X who represents the economic control variables 
consists of: the log of per capita GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity, the 
inflation rate, and the trade liberalization as measured by the ratio of the sum of 
imports and exports relative to GDP. The Log per capita GDP is here represented, 
because there is a large part of literature which attribute the financial development to 
an economic frameworks development, associated to an increase in the yields in a 
given economy.  
The inflation rate is included, because it may influence the economic 
decisions, mainly concerning the financial investment. Indeed, a high inflation rate 
would be able to discourage the use of financial intermediation, and foster the 
investment in real assets such as real estate
17
. Finally, trade openness is included as a 
control variable ad hoc. The relationship between financial trade and financial 
openness will be better explained later. Financial openness is measured by Chinn-Ito 
index (KAOPEN). 
Regressions were made for each of the four financial development indicators 
(FD): BLRBA, DCBS, DCPS and SMKC respectively banking liquidity ratio of 
banking assets, domestic credit granted by banking sector to GDP, domestic credit to 
private sector ratio of GDP, and finally stock market capitalization of listed 
companies to GDP. The first three indicators are related to the banking sector 
development, while the last is related to the capital markets development.  
The legal and institutional indicators used in this study are measures of the 
general level of institutional and legal development. The LEGAL indicator represents 
this general level. The CONCOR, RUL and VOA represent respectively control of 
corruption, rule of law and voice and accountability. These 3 last indicators are 
included in the LEGAL indicator and are extracted from the database made by 
Kaufmann. D, Kraay. A and Mastruzzi. M (2006)
18
. This database is updated until 
2005 of the same database constructed by Kaufmann. D, Kraay. A and Zoido-
Lobaton. P in 1998. The Kaufmann. D, Kraay. A and Mastruzzi. M database belongs 
                                                    
16
 to. H (2005) : « Financial Development and Financial Liberalization in Asia : Thresholds, 
Institutions and the Sequence of Liberalization », The North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, Vol 17(3). 
17
 That's why, the IFI care mainly about controlling the inflation, when they undertake reforms plan in 
a given economy. 
18 Kaufmann. D, Kraay. A et Mastruzzi. M (2006) : « Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators 
for 1996 to 2005 », www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govmatters5. 
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to a set of databases gathered by the World Bank in response to the grown interest 
shown by research on the theme of governance and its role in development.  
This database contains governance indicators on 213 countries covering 6 
dimensions of the governance: 
 
  Voice and accountability ; 
  Political stability and absence of violence ; 
  Government effectiveness ; 
  Regulatory quality ; 
  Rule of law ; 
  Control of corruption. 
 
In order to avoid endogeneity problems associated with short term cyclical 
effects, the model is specified as a panel error-correction model with non-overlapping 
data. Data are sampled only every five years between 1980 and 2000, and the five-
year average growth of the level of financial development is used as the dependent 
variable and the "initial conditions" for time-variant explanatory variables, including 
the initial level of the financial development indicator, for each five-year panel. The 
regressions are made for 10 south Mediterranean Sea countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) 
Before showing the regressions results of the first model, we have to clarify 
that for data we have, the institutional and legal indicators are invariables over time. 
Like shown by Wei (2000) for the corruption indexes, this kind of institutional 
indicators may induce a bias in the regression results. In the aim to avoid this 
problem, it's advisable to use averages for sub periods. In addition, the introduction of 
these factors as independent variables of time, probably, doesn't pose problems for the 
study. Because the features represented by the legal and institutional variables evolve 
very slowly over time.  
Furthermore, the aim of this study is to focus on the effect of the financial 
openness on the financial development, and not the effect of the legal and institutional 
development itself. In other words, rather than study the effect of the legal and 
institutional development on the financial development, the objective here is to see 
how the effect of the financial openness is modified by the quality of the institutional 
and legal environment. Thus, the temporal variations of legal and institutional 
variables are not critical in this study. 
Following the same approach of Ito (2005), the use of five year windows 
allows us to minimize the effect of financial bubbles that financial development 
indicators may unintentionally capture. But the use of five years as the length of each 
window is still arbitrary. That's why we changed, like tested by Ito, the length of 
Panel intervals. When the length of the window is changed to four as well as six 
years, the estimation results are qualitatively intact. 
 
b. Presentation and Interpretation of the regression results 
 
The regression results of the specified model in equation (1) are reported in the 
following table 1 and table 2. 
 
Table. 1 : Financial Development, Financial Openness, Institutional and 
Legal Development (LEGAL : General Development of the Legal and 
Institutional Environment) 
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 BLRBAt- DCBSt- DCPSt-DCPSt- SMKCt-SMKCt-
Financial openness (t - 5) -0.1617276 
(0.1390694) 
0.0334736 
(0.0775546) 
-0.0001281 
(0.0432938) 
-0.1180724 
(0.0455673) 
LEGAL -1.473957 
(1.221656)
-0.6400825 
(0.6779895)
-0.0886744 
(0.3533887) 
-1.35862 
(0.4469413) 
Interaction : 
LEGAL*Financial 
Openness (t-5) 
0.295587 
(0.2496302) 
0.3051935 
(0.1368052) 
0.0193313 
(0.0830774) 
0.4079559 
(0.1109774) 
Financial Deepening (t-5) 1.413549 
(0.2769219) 
0.061207 
(0.019675) 
0.5786786 
(0.2352529) 
1.209521 
(0.3765764) 
Log per capita GDP (t-5) 1.04379 
(0.6156936) 
0.5318692 
(0.3708727) 
-0.0925022 
(0.1972445) 
-0.048572 
(0.1951229) 
Inflation (t-5) 0.0089444 
(0.0213185) 
0.028908 
(0.0118197) 
-0.0066787 
(0.0066008) 
-0.0043489 
(0.0060746) 
Trade Openness (t-5) -0.7631034 
(1.184826) 
-1.269429 
(0.717984) 
-0.0547659 
(0.3645377) 
-0.0096942 
(0.3403386) 
Constant -8.780528 
(4.762831) 
-3.945675 
(2.832618) 
0.5651485 
(1.510498) 
2.730059 
(1.455797) 
R2 0.66 0.58 0.44 0.66 
 
Point estimates from OLS. Standard deviations are between parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year period. The 
financial deepening variable represents the initial state at the beginning of every 
period of 5 years of the dependant financial development variable. 
The coefficients in which we focus on these regressions are those related to the 
financial openness, the legal variable and the interaction between them. The 
regressions are made of every indicator representing the financial development. The 
BLRBA represents the banking liquidity, DCBS is the proxy of the importance and 
the weight of the banking sector in the economy by measuring the quantity of 
domestic credits granted. DCPS is the variable that measures the share of loans 
granted to the domestic private sector, and finally SMKC is the financial development 
indicator which measure the stock market capitalisation of listed companies. 
Table 1 reports the estimations with LEGAL representing the legal and 
institutional general development as dependant variable. Financial openness is 
supposed to act directly and interactively on financial development by controlling the 
legal and institutional general development. Indeed, the total effect of capital account 
openness can be showed as: 
 
Total effect of financial openness = (( 1 +  3L) Lis the mean of the legal development 
level. 
If we focus, for example, for the banking liquidity to banking assets ratio, we 
find that the total effect of an increase by one unit of financial openness is the loss of 
0.735 percentage of financial development (in this example approximated by the 
BLRBA ratio). In the case were the LEGAL mean for all the period is -1.947. Thus, 
the capital account openness can lead to a higher or lower level of financial 
development, depending of the legal and institutional development level. 
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Table 2 clarify this point. Indeed, the first line of the table reports the total effect of 
one unit increase in financial openness, on every financial development indicator. And 
there are 4 indicators : BLRBA, DCBS, DCPS and SMKC. The second line of the 
table reports the average level for the institutional and legal development for all the 
countries on all the period. While the third line reports the legal development 
threshold level, from where legal, financial openness starts "production" of financial 
development. 
 
Table 2: The total effect of one unit increase in financial openness on the financial 
development level 
 BLRBA DCBS DCPS SMKC 
Total effect of 
financial openness
-0.735 -0.56 -0.037 -0.91 
L (LEGAL) -1.947 
Legal development 
threshold 
0.547 -0.109 0.0066 0.289 
 
By way of example, and for the sake of comparison we can evoke the case of 
Thailand who knew a little increase in its financial openness index, but due to its high 
level of the LEGAL index (measuring the legal and institutional development), it's 
expected to have a growth rate of 1.2% of its stock market capitalization. 
Table 3 shows the regression results made on every component of the LEGAL 
index ; CONCOR, RUL and VOA which represent respectively the level of corruption 
control, rule of law and voice and accountability taken distinctly and in interaction 
with the financial openness index. From the results shown by this table, we can notice 
that via the different regressions made, those with the DCBA indicator are the most 
demonstrative of the importance to be doted by a developed legal and institutional 
system. This result is important when we know the place and the weight of the 
banking systems in the countries in which we interest. The banking system in the 
majority of the region's countries is merely confounded with the financial sector1, 
which means that its development is equivalent to the development of the whole 
financial sector, and denotes its responsibility in the growth and accumulation 
process. 
Also, another observation emerges from the reading of the regression results 
table. It's the fact that financial openness coefficient taken alone is negative, and it 
continues to be negative even when we make it in interaction with the legal, 
institutional development indicator. That notices that financial openness wouldn't 
bring financial development without a reasonable level of legal and institutional 
development level. That reasonable level in not yet reached by the countries of the 
region 1 Elsewhere, the stock market data are inexistent for some countries of the 
region (Syria and Libya especially) for many years. 
 
Table. 3 : Financial development, financial openness, legal (components of LEGAL : Corruption 
control CONCOR, rule of law and institutional development ' RUL, voice and accountability) 
 BLRBAt -
BLRBAt-5 
DCBSt - DCBSt- DCPSt - 
DCPSt-5 
SMKCt - 
SMKCt-5 
Financial openness(t-5) -0.148 (0.162) -0.0563 (0.0723) -0.046 
(0.043) 
-0.114 (0.0616) 
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CONCOR -0.209 -0.491 (0.254) -0.289 (0.15) -0.405 (0.197) 
Interaction : 
CONCOR*Financial Openness 
0.185 (0.0946) 0.239 (0.0844) 0.03 (0.048) 0.121 (0.071) 
Financial deepening (t-5) 1.25 (0.256) 0.0649 (0.152) 0.518 (0.193) 0.485 (0.372) 
Log of per capita GDP (t-5) 0.841 (0.644) 0.742 (0.313) 0.062 (0.182) 0.145 (0.249) 
Inflation (t-5) 0.002 (0.022) 0.0255 (0.0101) -0.0073 
(0.0058)
-0.003 (0.007) 
Trade openness(t-5) -0.436 (1.267) -1.669 (0.587) -0.3 (0.324) -0.034 (0.447) 
Constant -7.001 (4.88) -5.278 (2.357) -0.528 
(1.376) 
1.262 (1.863) 
R2 0.63 0.7 0.58 0.46 
 BLRBAt -
BLRBAt-5 
DCBSt-DCBSt-5 DCPSt-
DCPSt-5
SMKCt-SMKCt-
5 
Financial openness (t-5) -0.103 (0.175) -0.066 (0.0922) -0.0026 
(0.0475) 
0.018 (0.0391) 
RUL 0.117 (0.786) -0.377 (0.402) -0.331 
(0.228) 
-1.097 (0.24) 
Interaction : RUL*Financial 
Openness (t-5) 
0.2 (0.0266) 0.335 (0.136) 0.0055 
(0.0755) 
0.402 (0.0844) 
Financial Deepening (t-5) 1.251 (0.262) 0.0436 (0.0163) 0.679 (0.22) 1.4 (0.312) 
Log per capita GDP (t-5) 0.706 (0.610) 0.42 (0.333) -0.0553 
(0 178)
-0.221 (0.157) 
Inflation (t-5) 0.000456 (0.0241) 0.0355 (0.0125) -0.004 
(0.0064) 
-0.0022 (0.0051) 
Trade openness (t-5) -0.155 (1.225) -0.89 (0.607) -0.08 (0.313) 0.179 (0.265) 
Constant -6.055 (4.63) -3.109 (2.539) 0.267 (1.363) 4.219 (1.208) 
R2 0.63 0.59 0.78 
 BLRBAt-BLRBAt-
5 
DCBSt-DCBSt-5 DCPSt-
DCPSt-5 
SMKCt-SMKCt-
5 
Financial openness(t-5) -0.097 (0.152) 0.183 (0.0885) 0.0128 
(0.046) 
-0.107 (0.0611) 
VOA -0.186 (0.573) 0.175 (0.3) -0.035 
(0 182)
0.327 (0.234) 
Interaction : VOA*Financial 
openness (t-5) 
0.035 (0.136) 0.211 (0.075) 0.0145 
(0.0416) 
0.098 (0.0503) 
Financial deepening (t-5) 1.264 (0.257) 0.0512 (0.0172) 0.542 (0.235) 0.427 (0.351) 
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Log per capita GDP (t-5) 0.648 (0.623) 0.207 (0.345) -0.13 (0.19) 0.165 (0.229) 
Inflation (t-5) 0.0043 (0.0219) 0.0279 (0.0118) -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.0027 (0.007) 
Trade openness (t-5) -0.284 (1.16) -0.604 (0.611) -0.0141 
(0.338)
0.346 (0.402) 
Constant -5.631 (4.715) -1.375 (2.617) 0.87 (1.455) 0.906 (1.766) 
 0.63 0.7 0.44 0.5 
 
Point estimates from OLS. Standard deviation are between parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year period.. 
Financial openness is measured by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN). The financial 
deepening variable represents the initial state at the beginning of every period of 5 
years of the dependant financial development variable. As was the case for the 
LEGAL indicator, we report on a table the thresholds from which financial openness 
start "production" of financial development for the region's countries. 
 
Table 4: Total effect on financial development indicators growth following a one-unit 
increase of the financial openness indicator 
 BLRBA DCBS DCPS SMKC 
Total effect of 
financial openness 
-0.169 -0.083 -0.049 -0.127 
L(CONCOR) -0.113 
Legal development 
threshold 
0.8 0.235 1.53 0.942 
 BLRBA DCBS DCPS SMKC 
Total effect of 
financial openness 
-0.12 -0.092 -0.003 -0.014 
L(RUL) -0.0804 
Legal development 
threshold 
0.515 0.197 0.472 -0.044 
 BLRBA DCBS DCPS SMKC 
Total effect of 
financial openness 
-0.122 0.0289 0.0022 -0.178 
L (VOA) -0.73 
Legal of 
development 
threshold 
2.77 -0.867 -0.88 1.091 
 
The analysis results of table 4 confirm the financial development state 
typology, made at the beginning of the paper. Which inform us that there is a ranking 
of countries according to the degree of financial development. Indeed, the financial 
openness is detrimental for almost all the region's countries, given their actual legal 
and institutional environment quality. 
The case of the VOA indicator which represents the democratic degree of the 
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political institutions is an exception. Indeed, for that indicator, it's possible to benefit 
from the financial openness, to improve the quantity of credits to private sector, and 
even credits granted by banking sector (DCPS and DCBS).  
However, when we focus on the average level of that indicator for Israel 
(0.908), we can doubt that it influence the global average level of the region, which 
exceed the threshold level (The global average level for whole region is -0.73, while it 
would be enough to have respectively -0.867 and -0.88 to realize an increase in the 
distribution of credits by banking sector, and the allocation of credits to the private 
sector. In addition, the threshold level is reached only by Israel and Jordan, with 
respectively (0.908) and (-0.326). While, for Libya and Syria, the levels are 
respectively (-1.583) and (-1.485) which are largely below the threshold level (-0.867 
for the DCBS indicator and -0.88 for the DCPS level). 
This classification according to the legal and institutional development 
reminds us, the one made depending on the financial development level, in page 3 of 
this paper. So it is clear to note that if a country comes to building legal, judicial 
system reliable and credible institutions, it has more opportunities to benefit from 
globalization and the benefits of financial openness. Elsewhere, Israel is the more 
financially "opened" country, and where the financial system is the more liberalised 
among the region's countries. In this case, we can doubt that, the high financial 
development level of this country, is the main reason of its openness and its financial 
integration. In other words, we have to check, if it's the financial development who 
leads to financial openness and not vice versa. That's what we will try to answer to in 
what following. 
 
c.   Test of the reverse causality between financial openness and economic 
development 
 
One may wonder, in light of recent findings, whether it is the financial 
development that brings the country to pursue policies of liberalization and financial 
openness rather than the reverse. If we can show that the inverse relationship between 
financial development and financial openness is not relevant, it may be considered 
that countries can achieve the development of their financial system by deciding in a 
exogenous way to liberalize their financial systems or not. 
In the aim to test this hypothesis, we changed the equation of the first model, 
swapping places of KAOPEN indicator and measures of financial development 
(BLRBA, DCBS, DCPS, SMKC). The dependent variable is, hereafter, the level of 
growth over 5 years of the financial openness indicator, whereas exogenous variables 
are now indicators of financial development and their interaction with the variable 
LEGAL. The model is as follows: 
 
Equation (2) 
kaopen; -kaopen;_5 =^0 + ^kaopen;_5 +^fd;_5 +(2 v + )^& xfo[_5) + *[_5( + 
 
The coefficient of interest in this regression is (1. If we find that it's 
significantly positive, it means that the regressions found above suffer from a form of 
simultaneity and that financial development led to the financial openness. 
The results of equation's (2) regression show that through the various measures 
of financial development, as well as various indicators of legal and institutional 
development, the estimated coefficients are for the most part not statistically 
significant or significantly negatives. Indeed, over the 16 estimated coefficients (4 
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indicators of financial development BLRBA, DCBS, DCPS, SMKC for 4 legal and 
institutional development indicators LEGAL, CONCOR, RUL, VOA) we found only 
three (1 significantly positive. These 3 factors are related to the financial 
development according to the BLRBA indicator. However, we found above in the 
context of the first equation regressions that coefficients different from the values 
expected, were all relating to the BLRBA indicator. 
This invites us to believe that the choice of the indicator itself is the problem 
rather than the reliance of the regressions made. This leads us to conclude that the 
regressions made on the conditions under which the legal and institutional 
development influences the financial development do not suffer from problems of 
simultaneity. The other equally important fact that draws from these results is that 
financial development does not necessarily lead to financial openness.  
In other words, a country that is making steady progress in the use of its 
financial system is not obliged to open its "financial borders", since the achievement 
of financial development is not necessarily a step before the financial openness. In 
many cases, it is rather the opposite that is suggested. Financial development achieved 
in a given economy should not be quickly delivered to an international competition 
suddenly and in a not gradual manner.  
The example of South Korea represents a benchmark. We should proceed by 
steps in the process of financial liberalization and openness, in order to benefit from 
financial globalization and the opening up to international competition. This is what 
economists call the "gradualism" or "sequencing". 
 
d.  The importance of the sequencing 
 
According to McKinnon (1991), the capital account openness must be the 
latest in a long series of liberalization and should only take place once the 
liberalization of trade has been completed. Nevertheless, the theoretical merits of this 
claim were not always confirmed by the empirical work dealing with the issue. Thus, 
Haggard and Maxfield (1993) have shown that trade liberalization is a prerequisite for 
the financial openness while Leblang (1977) found no effect of trade liberalization on 
financial liberalization.  
Aizenman and Noy (2004) have discovered a two-way relationship between 
the financial openness and trade liberalization, although they have found that financial 
openness leads to trade liberalization rather than the reverse. Tornell and al. (2004) 
have shown that financial liberalization has always followed the liberalization of trade 
during the last two decades. 
In what follows, we will try to test the hypothesis that trade liberalization is a 
prerequisite for financial openness. To do so, we used the following model : 
 
KAOPENt = +0 + +1KAOPEN5-t + +2 TRADEOPEN5-t    + Z1-t  / t 5-, + vt 
 
Where: Zt-1 / t-5 is the vector of macroeconomic variables control; the budget deficit, 
international reserves and GDP per capita. The choice of the first two variables is 
justified by the fact that they represent the determinants of capital controls. The 
variable of per capita GDP is incorporated to reflect the level of development of the 
economic system. Because these variables are supposed to monitor the general trend 
of macroeconomic variables, they are included as average on sub 5 years. 
Trade openness is represented here by the variable TRADEOPEN which is the 
reciprocal of the weighted average of burdens imposed on imports and exports. This 
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variable measures the de jure open trade because the variable KAOPEN also 
represents the de jure financial openness. Unlike the ratio sum of exports and imports 
relative to GDP, which is a variable of the de facto open trade. 
We will also test the existence of an inverse relationship between trade 
liberalization and financial openness. In other words, we will see if the financial 
openness leads to trade liberalization by the regression of this model : 
 
TRADEOPENt =+0 ++[ TRADEOPENt5 ++2 'KAOPEN5-t    +Z1-t/t5-- + wt 
 
In order to avoid the problem of two-way causality, in both types of 
regressions, we use a non-overlapping panel data analysis as in the other regressions. 
Although the difference with the other analyses is that the macro variables are 
included as the five-year average. Thus, both KAOPEN and TRADEOPEN are 
included as the initial conditions of each five-year panel. In the empirical results, we 
focus on the coefficients +2 and .2 to see if the trade openness can be a precondition 
for financial opening, or the reversed causality is true. Table 5 summarizes the results 
of estimating both models. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Capital Account and Trade Openness 
 KAOPEN TRADEOPEN 
Financial openness (t-5) 0.773 (0.133) 26.149 (9.093) 
Trade Openness (t-5) 0.0158 (0.007) 0.698 (0.217) 
Average Budget Deficit (t-1/t-
5) 
0.0135 (0.0751) 0.404 (2.346) 
Average Total Reserves (t-1/t-
5) 
0.00000363 (0.0717) -12.017 (5.344) 
Average GDP per capita (t-1/t-
5) 
-0.0803 (0.272) 13.452 (16.701) 
Constant 2.11 (1.82) -30.05 (121.812) 
R2 0.67 0.96
 
Standard deviations are between parentheses. Budget surplus, total reserves, 
and GDP per capita are included at the average over t-1 through t-5. KAOPEN and 
TRADEOPEN are estimated in first differences. 
The first column of the table shows that none of the macroeconomic variables 
control (fiscal deficit, total reserves and GDP per capita) has a significant coefficient. 
However, the coefficient of initial market opening is significant and confirms the 
hypothesis which states that trade liberalization is a necessary condition for the 
success of the capital account openness. Nevertheless, the results of the second 
column of the table belie the empirical results found in earlier studies conducted on 
the link between trade liberalization and financial openness. Because for all the 
countries subject to our study, it appears that there is an inverse relationship between 
the capital account openness and trade liberalization. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The issue of financial development in emerging countries continues to attract 
interest, the reactions of the community of economists and mainly continues to 
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generate controversy. Indeed, the classical economists seem to believe in the benefits 
of free trade and its applicability for the financial field. Another piece of the economic 
literature, especially from neo structuralists economists refute this idea and instead 
believe in the benefits of protectionism, particularly in the financial field. The aim of 
the study undertaken in the context of this paper was to show an objective risks that 
may incur today countries south Mediterranean sea countries (which represent similar 
features to all developing countries, excepting the case of Israel), by insertion in a 
globalized financial sphere. 
We deliberately used the term risk, because the governors and other economic 
policy makers in these countries seem rather brought to the financial openness 
forgetting the preconditions necessary for its accomplishment. Indeed, it appears from 
the results of this study that for all indicators of financial development, the current 
state of legal and institutional development can not ensure an improvement in 
financial systems activity and efficiency. It is therefore not advisable in view of these 
results to pursue an aim of financial openness before realizing these prerequisites. 
This conclusion, that we come in the end of this study, seems not to be taken 
into account by the region' countries (for example, Tunisia had already planned to 
institute soon, the full liberalization of the Tunisian Dinar). Rather than opening the 
financial "borders", the best way would be to prepare the groundwork for such a 
choice, by improving the quality of the legal and institutional environment. But it 
seems that in logic of "wild" financial globalization, the States, especially, in the 
developing world, have lost so much flexibility and autonomy in the pursuit of their 
beneficial goals. They are obliged to follow the proposals and dictates of the 
international financial institutions, already at the mercy of a few private interests. 
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